Abstract. We show that in any game that is continuous at in…nity, if a plan of action a i is played by a type t i in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, then there are perturbations of t i for which a i is the only rationalizable plan and whose unique rationalizable belief regarding the play of the game is arbitrarily close to the equilibrium belief of t i . As an application to repeated games, we prove an unre…nable folk theorem: Any individually rational and feasible payo¤ is the unique rationalizable payo¤ vector for some perturbed type pro…le. This is true even if perturbed types are restricted to believe that the repeated-game payo¤ structure and the discount factor are common knowledge.
Introduction
In the in…nite-horizon dynamic games commonly used in economic applications, the set of equilibrium strategies is often very large. For example, the classic folk theorems for repeated games state that every individually-rational payo¤ pro…le can be achieved in a subgame-perfect equilibrium. A less transparent example is Rubinstein's (1982) bargaining game; although there is a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium, any outcome can occur in Nash equilibrium. Consequently, economists focus on strong re…nements of equilibrium and ignore other equilibria. For instance, they might select the Rubinstein outcome in bargaining games or an e¢ cient outcome in repeated games. All of these applications assume common knowledge of payo¤s. The robustness program in game theory seeks to determine when strong predictions from equilibrium re…nements can be maintained despite a slight relaxation Date: First Version: March 2009; This Version: January 2012. This paper was written when the authors were members at the Institute for Advanced Study. We thank them for their generous …nancial support and hospitality. We are grateful to Gabriel Carroll, George Mailath, the audiences in several presentations, two anonymous referees, and an editor for very useful comments. 1 of common-knowledge assumptions. 1 Here, we show a lack of robustness of such predictions:
any equilibrium outcome may become uniquely rationalizable when beliefs are perturbed, so that no equilibrium action can ever be ruled out without an extremely precise knowledge of players'beliefs.
Our work here builds on existing results, which show a similar lack of robustness in …-nite games (Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) , Chen (2008) ). Many important economic models, including those mentioned above, employ in…nite-horizon dynamic games, so here we establish several di¤erent extensions which apply to such games. Our most notable application is an "unre…nable" folk theorem for in…nite repeated games: For every payo¤ v in the interior of the individually rational and feasible set, and for su¢ ciently patient players, we construct a perturbation such that v is the unique rationalizable outcome. Moreover, in the situation described by the perturbation, all players anticipate that the payo¤s are within an "-neighborhood of v. That is, the complete-information game is surrounded by types with a unique solution, but the unique solution varies in such a way that it traces all individually rational and feasible payo¤s. While the multiplicity in the standard folk theorems suggests the need for a re…nement to obtain clear predictions, the multiplicity in our unre…nable folk theorem shows the impossibility of a robust re…nement. In the same vein, in Rubinstein's bargaining model, we show that any bargaining outcome is the unique rationalizable outcome for some perturbation. Once again, no re…nement can robustly rule out these outcomes.
These applications follow from our Proposition 1, which states: For any Bayesian Nash equilibrium and any type t i , there exists a perturbed typet i for which the equilibrium action plan of t i is the unique rationalizable plan. Furthermore, the unique rationalizable belief oft i regarding the outcome is arbitrarily close to the equilibrium belief of t i . In particular, if the original game has complete information, then the perturbed type assigns probability nearly one to the equilibrium path (Corollary 1). Here the meaning of "perturbation"is that t i may be chosen such that t i andt i have similar beliefs about the payo¤ functions, similar beliefs about the other players'beliefs about the payo¤ functions, similar beliefs about the other players'beliefs about the players'beliefs about the payo¤ functions, and so on, up to an arbitrarily chosen …nite order. Hence, if a researcher has noisy information about the players'beliefs up to a …nite order but does not have any other information, then he cannot 1 See for example, Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts and Wilson (1982) , Fudenberg, Kreps, and Levine (1988) , Rubinstein (1989) , Monderer and Samet (1989) , and Kajii and Morris (1997) . distinguish some of the perturbationst i from the original type t i . Consequently, he cannot verify a prediction about the behavior of t i unless it is also true fort i . In particular, by Proposition 1, he cannot verify any prediction of an equilibrium re…nement that does not follow from equilibrium alone.
In some applications, a researcher may believe that even if there is higher-order uncertainty about payo¤s, there is common knowledge of some of the basic structure of payo¤s and information. In particular, in a repeated game, he may wish to retain common knowledge that the players'payo¤s in the repeated game are the discounted sum of the stage-game payo¤s.
The perturbations constructed in Proposition 1 would not maintain such common knowledge, and in general, restrictions on perturbations sometimes lead to sharper predictions. In the particular case of repeated games, however, we show (Proposition 4) that our conclusions remain intact: the perturbed types in the unre…nable folk theorem can be constructed while maintaining full common knowledge that we are playing a repeated game with commonly known discount factor, with uncertainly only concerning the stage-game payo¤s. 2 In the same vein, Penta (2008) describes robust predictions, under sequential rationality, when the fact that certain parameters are known to certain players is common knowledge. He shows that restrictions on information, combined with restricted payo¤ spaces, may lead to sharper predictions. In Section 6 we extend Penta's characterization to in…nite-horizon games.
Our Proposition 1 applies more narrowly than the existing structure theorems, but with a stronger conclusion. It applies only to action plans played in some equilibrium, and not to all rationalizable plans. The stronger conclusion is that the perturbed types actually expect the selected equilibrium outcome to occur as the unique rationalizable play. Without this stronger conclusion, the selected outcome may be realized only by types who are surprised by their opponents' moves and play moves they did not expect to play (see Example 3).
This would prevent one from applying the existing structure theorems to the analysis of equilibrium payo¤s, so the stronger conclusion is important to our unre…nable folk theorem.
We have also established the natural extension of previous results to all rationalizable actions in in…nite dynamic games; see our working paper (2009).
After laying out the model in the next section, we present our general results in Section 3. We present our applications to repeated games and bargaining in Sections 4 and 5,
respectively. We present extensions of our results to Penta's framework in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. The proofs of our general results are presented in the appendix.
Basic Definitions
We suggest that the reader skim this section quickly and refer back as necessary. The main text is not very notation-heavy.
Extensive game forms. We consider standard n-player extensive-form games with possibly in…nite horizon, as modeled in Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) . In particular, we …x an extensive game form = N; H; (I i ) i2N with perfect recall where N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng is a …nite set of players, H is a set of histories, and I i is the set of information sets at which player i 2 N moves. We use i 2 N and h 2 H to denote a generic player and history, respectively. We write I i (h) for the information set that contains history h, at which player i moves, i.e. the set of histories i …nds possible when he moves. The set of available moves
Hg, where (h; b i ) denotes the history in which h is followed by b i . We assume that B i (h) is …nite for each h. An action plan (or simply action) a i of i is de…ned as any contingent plan that maps the information sets of i to the moves available at those information sets; i.e. a i :
We write A = A 1 A n for the set of action pro…les a = (a 1 ; : : : ; a n ). 3 We write Z for the set of terminal nodes, at which no player moves. We write z (a) for the terminal history that is reached by pro…le a.
Type spaces. Given an extensive game form, a Bayesian game is de…ned by specifying the belief structure about the payo¤s. To this end, we write (z) = ( 1 (z) ; : : : ; n (z)) 2 [0; 1] n for the payo¤ vector at the terminal node z 2 Z and write for the set of all payo¤
The payo¤ of i from an action pro…le a is denoted by u i ( ; a).
3 Notation: Given any list X 1 ; : : : ; X n of sets, write X = X 1 X n with typical element x, X i = Q j6 =i X j with typical element x i , and (x i ; x i ) = (x 1 ; : : : ; x i 1 ; x i ; x i+1 ; : : : ; x n ). Likewise, for any family of functions f j : X j ! Y j , we de…ne f i : X i ! X i by f i (x i ) = (f j (x j )) j6 =i . This is with the exception that h is a history as in dynamic games, rather than a pro…le of hierarchies (h 1 ; : : : ; h n ). Given any topological space X, we write (X) for the space of probability distributions on X, endowed with Borel -algebra and the weak topology.
Note that u i ( ; a) = i (z (a)). We endow with the product topology (i.e. the topology of pointwise convergence). Note that is compact and u i is continuous in . Note, however, that is not a metric space. We will use only …nite type spaces, so by a model, we mean a …nite set T 1 T n associated with beliefs t i 2 ( 
for each t i 2 T i . Note that ( ; ; T; ) de…nes a Bayesian game. In this paper, we consider games that vary by their type spaces for a …xed game form .
Hierarchies of Beliefs. Given any type t i in a type space T , we can compute the …rst-
of t i (about and the …rst-order beliefs), etc., using the joint distribution of the types and . Using the mapping h i :
: : :), we can embed all such models in the universal type space, denoted by T = T 1 T n (Mertens and Zamir (1985) ; see also Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) ). We endow the universal type space with the product topology of usual weak convergence. We say that a sequence of types t i (m) converges to a
where the latter convergence is in weak topology, i.e., "convergence in distribution."
Equivalence of Actions and Continuity at In…nity. We now turn to the details of the
is formed by L moves for some …nite L, then h is said to be …nite and have length L. If h contains in…nitely many moves, then h is said to be in…nite. A game form is said to have …nite horizon if for some L < 1 all histories have length at most L; the game form is said to have in…nite horizon otherwise. For any history
and any L 0 , we write h L 0 for the subhistory of h that is truncated at length L 0 ;
. We say that a game ( ; ; T; ) is continuous at in…nity 4 (…rst de…ned by Fudenberg and Levine (1983)) i¤ for any " > 0, there exists L < 1, such that
In that we do not allow L to depend on , this de…nition assumes that the possible payo¤ functions in the game are equicontinuous at in…nity. This equicontinuity, as opposed to mere continuity of each , holds in all of our applications but is not needed in our propositions; it is useful for establishing certain properties of interim correlated rationalizability, noted in the next section. See Weinstein and Yildiz (2012) for more.
for all i 2 N and all terminal histories h;h 2 Z.
We say that actions a i and a
For any integer L, we say that a i and a
That is, two actions are L-equivalent if both actions prescribe the same moves in the …rst L moves on the path against every action pro…le a i by others. For the …rst L moves a i and a 0 i can di¤er only at the informations sets that they preclude. Of course this is the same as the usual equivalence when the game has a …nite horizon that is shorter than L.
We will con…ne ourselves to the games that are continuous at in…nity throughout, including our perturbations. Note that most games analyzed in economics are continuous at in…nity. This includes repeated games with discounting, games of sequential bargaining with discounting, all …nite-horizon games, and so on. Games that are excluded include repeated games with a limit of averages criterion, or bargaining without discounting; generally, any case in which there can be a signi…cant e¤ect from the arbitrarily far future.
Interim Correlated Rationalizability. For each i 2 N and for each belief 2 (
we write BR i ( ) for the set of actions a i 2 A i that maximize the expected value of u i ( ; a i ; a i ) under the probability distribution . Note that BR i is non-empty under continuity at in…nity, because this implies continuity with respect to the product topology on histories, and that topology is compact by Tychono¤'s theorem. A solution concept 
That is, a i is a best response to a belief of t i that puts positive probability only to the actions that survive the elimination in round k 1. We write
This equality of the two concepts implies that the in…nite intersection is non-empty.
Interim correlated rationalizability was introduced by Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2007) (see also Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) for a related concept). They show that the ICR set for a given type is completely determined by its hierarchy of beliefs, so we will sometimes refer to the ICR set of a hierarchy or "universal type." They also show that ICR is upperhemicontinuous for …nite games. While this is not known to be true for all in…nite games, we show that it is true under the present assumptions in Weinstein and Yildiz (2012) .
ICR is the weakest rationalizability concept, and our main results such as Proposition 1 carry over to any stronger, non-empty concept by a very simple argument: If an action is uniquely ICR for a perturbed type, it is also uniquely selected by the stronger concept at that type. In particular, our result is true without modi…cation for the interim sequential rationalizability (ISR) concept of Penta (2008) , if no further restriction on players'information and beliefs is made. The concept of ISR does entail some modi…cation to our arguments when combined with restrictions on players'information; see Section 6.
Finally, a few more de…nitions: We …x a set A = A 1 A n of action pro…les where 
Structure Theorem
In this section we will present our main result for general in…nite-horizon games. Given any game ( ; ; T; ) that is continuous at in…nity and any Bayesian Nash equilibrium s :
T ! A, we will show that there are perturbationst i of types t i for which s i t i is the only rationalizable plan. Moreover, the unique rationalizable belief oft i regarding the outcomes is arbitrarily closed to the belief oft i under s. The following existing structure theorem plays a crucial role in our construction.
Lemma 1 Yildiz (2007, 2009 ) and Chen (2008)). For any game ( ; ; T; )
that is continuous at in…nity, for any type t i 2 T i of any player i 2 N , any rationalizable
in the universal type space T , and any L, there exists a hierarchy h i t i 2 U i ; such that for each a
i is L-equivalent to a i , andt i is a type in some …nite, common-prior model. (2007) we showed the structure theorem for …nite-action games in normal form, under the assumption that the space of payo¤s is rich enough that any action is dominant under some payo¤ speci…cation. While this richness assumption holds when one relaxes all common-knowledge assumptions on payo¤ functions in a static game, it fails if one …xes a non-trivial dynamic game tree. This is because a plan of action cannot be strictly dominant when some information sets may not be reached. Chen (2008) The result can then be interpreted as follows: Consider a type t with a rationalizable action plan a. For some arbitrarily chosen k, suppose we …nd it impossible to distinguish types whose beliefs are similar up through order k. The lemma states that, for any L, there is a …nite Bayesian game with typet who we cannot distinguish from t and for which a is the unique rationalizable action plan through period L.
In Weinstein and Yildiz
Lemma 1 has one important limitation. Given any rationalizable path z (a) and L, Lemma 1 establishes that there is a pro…le t = (t 1 ; : : : ; t n ) of perturbed types for which z L (a) is the unique rationalizable path up to L. Nevertheless, these perturbed types may all …nd the path z L (a) unlikely at the start of play, as we establish next.
Cooperation in Twice-Repeated Prisoners'Dilemma. Consider a twice-repeated prisoners'dilemma game with complete information and with no discounting. We shall need the has a unique best reply, the player must assign positive probability to the event that the other player cooperates in the …rst round. Such cooperation must make him update his beliefs about the payo¤s in such a way that Cooperate becomes a better response than Defect.
Since the de…nition of perturbation requires that, ex ante, he believes with high probability the payo¤s are similar to the repeated prisoner dilemma, under which Defect is dominant in the second round, this drastic updating implies that t T 4T …nds it unlikely that the other player will play Cooperate in the …rst round. Therefore, the perturbed type is nearly certain that he will play Defect in the second round.
The above example demonstrates that the beliefs of the perturbed types in Lemma 1 may drastically diverge from the unique rationalizable outcome. This prevents us from applying Lemma 1 to study the expected payo¤s and the players' intended play. Our next result overcomes this limitation. For this, we need an outcome to be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium rather than merely rationalizable. Proposition 1. Let G = ( ; ; T; ) be a Bayesian game that is continuous at in…nity, and s : T ! A be a strategy pro…le in G. Then, the following are equivalent:
(A): s is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of G.
(B): For any i 2 N , for any t i 2 T i , for any neighborhood U i of h i (t i ) in the universal type space T , and for any neighborhood V i of the belief ( jt i ; s ) of type t i under s , there exists a hierarchy h i t i 2 U i such that
(2) the unique rationalizable belief^ 2
Moreover, for every " > 0,t i above can be chosen so that jE
Given a Bayesian Nash equilibrium s , the …rst conclusion states that the equilibrium action s i (t i ) is the only rationalizable action for the perturbed type in reduced form. The second conclusion states that the rationalizable belief of the perturbed typet i is approximately the same as the equilibrium belief of the original type t i . Hence, the limitation of Lemma 1 above does not apply. Moreover, the second conclusion immediately implies that the interim expected payo¤s according to the perturbed typet i under rationalizability are close to the equilibrium expected payo¤s according to t i . All in all, Proposition 1 establishes that no equilibrium outcome can be ruled out as the unique rationalizable outcome without knowledge of in…nite hierarchy of beliefs, both in terms of actual realization and in terms of players'ex-ante expectations.
One may wonder if one can reach such a strong conclusion for other rationalizable strategies. The answer is a …rm no; in fact, Proposition 1 establishes that the converse is also true: if for every type t i one can …nd a perturbation under which the the players'interim beliefs are close to the beliefs under the original strategy pro…le s (condition 2) and if the action
is uniquely rationalizable for the perturbed type (condition 1), then s is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. This is simply because, by the Maximum Theorem, the two conditions imply that s i (t i ) is indeed a best reply for t i against s i .
We will later apply this result to some popular complete-information games. In order to state the result for complete-information games, we …x a payo¤ function , and consider the game in which is common knowledge. This game is represented by type pro…le t CK ( ) in the universal type space.
be a complete-information game that is continuous at in…nity, and a be a Nash equilibrium of this game. For any i 2 N , for any neighbor-
( )) in the universal type space T , and any " > 0, there exists a hierarchy h i t i 2 U i ; such that for every rationalizable belief oft i ,
(2) Pr (z (a ) j ; a i ) 1 ", and
For any Nash equilibrium a of any complete-information game, the corollary presents a pro…let of perturbations under which (1) the equilibrium a is the unique rationalizable action pro…le, (2) all players'rationalizable beliefs assign nearly probability one to the equilibrium outcome z (a ), and (3) the expected payo¤s under these beliefs are nearly identical to the equilibrium payo¤s. As established in Proposition 1, one can …nd such perturbations only for Nash equilibria.
The proof of Proposition 1 uses a contagion argument that is suitable for equilibrium. In order to illustrate the construction, we sketch the proof for the complete-information games considered in the corollary. Building on Lemma 1 we …rst show that for each action a i there exists a type t a i for which a i is uniquely rationalizable, extending a result of Chen to in…nite-horizon games. For any Nash equilibrium a of any complete-information game ; f g ; t CK ( ) ; , we construct a family of types t j;m; , j 2 N , m 2 N, 2 [0; 1], by
where ( ;t i;m 1; ) is the Dirac measure that puts probability one on ( ; t i;m 1; ). For large m and small , t i;m; satis…es all the desired properties oft i . To see this, …rst note that for = 0, under t i;m;0 , it is mth-order mutual knowledge that = . Hence, when m is large and is small, the belief hierarchy of t i;m;0 is close to the belief hierarchy of t
according to which it is common knowledge that = . Second, for > 0, a j is uniquely rationalizable for t j;m; in reduced form. To see this, observing that it is true for m = 0 by de…nition of t j;0; , assume that it is true up to some m 1. Then, any rationalizable belief of any type t j;m; must be a mixture of two beliefs. With probability , his belief is the same as that of t a j , to which a j is the unique best response in reduced form actions. With probability 1 , the true state is and the other players play a j (in reduced form), in which case a j is a best reply, as a is a Nash equilibrium under . Therefore, in reduced form a j is the unique best response to any of his rationalizable beliefs, showing that a j is uniquely rationalizable for t j;m; in reduced form. Finally, for any m > 0, under rationalizability type t i;m; must assign at least probability 1 on ; a i in reduced form because a i is uniquely rationalizable for t i;m 1; in reduced form.
Application: An Unrefinable Folk Theorem
In this section, we consider in…nitely repeated games with complete information. Under the standard assumptions for the folk theorem, we prove an unre…nable folk theorem, which concludes that for every individually rational and feasible payo¤ vector v, there exists a perturbation of beliefs under which there is a unique rationalizable outcome and players expect to enjoy approximately the payo¤ vector v under any rationalizable belief. In the complete-information game, the players maximize the average discounted stage payo¤s. That is, the payo¤ function is
where 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, which we will let vary. Denote the repeated game by
) be the set of feasible payo¤ vectors (from correlated mixed action pro…les), where co takes the convex hull. De…ne also the pure-action min-max payo¤ as
for each i 2 N . We de…ne the set of feasible and individually rational payo¤ vectors as
We denote the interior of V by intV . The interior will be non-empty when a weak form of full-rank assumption holds. The following lemma states a typical folk theorem (see Proposition 9.3.1 in Mailath and Samuelson (2006) and also Fudenberg and Maskin (1991) ).
Lemma 2. For every v 2 intV , there exists < 1 such that for all 2 ; 1 , G has a subgame-perfect equilibrium a in pure strategies, such that u ( ; a ) = v.
The lemma states that every feasible and individually rational payo¤ vector in the interior can be supported as the subgame-perfect equilibrium payo¤ when the players are su¢ ciently patient. Given such a large multiplicity, both theoretical and applied researchers often focus on e¢ cient equilibria (or extremal equilibria). Combining such a folk theorem with Corollary 1, our next result establishes that the multiplicity is irreducible.
Proposition 2. For all v 2 intV and " > 0, there exists < 1 such that for all 2 ; 1 , every open neighborhood U of t CK ( ) contains a type pro…let 2 U such that
(1) eacht i has a unique rationalizable action a i in reduced form, and (2) under every rationalizable belief oft i , the expected payo¤s are all within " neighborhood of v:
Proof. Fix any v 2 intV and " > 0. By Lemma 2, there exists < 1 such that for all 2 ; 1 , G has a subgame-perfect equilibrium a in pure strategies, such that u ( ; a ) = v.
Then, by Corollary 1, for any 2 ; 1 and any open neighborhood U of t CK ( ), there exists a type pro…let 2 U such that eacht i has a unique rationalizable action a i in reduced form (Part 1 of Corollary 1), and under every rationalizable belief oft i , the expected payo¤s are all within " neighborhood of u ( ; a ) = v (Part 3 of Corollary 1).
Proposition 2 establishes an unre…nable folk theorem. It states that every individually rational and feasible payo¤ v in the interior can be supported by the unique rationalizable outcome for some perturbation. Moreover, in the actual situation described by the perturbation, all players play according to the subgame-perfect equilibrium that supports v and all players anticipate that the payo¤s are within " neighborhood of v. That is, the complete-information game is surrounded by types with a unique solution, but the unique solution varies in such a way that it traces all individually rational and feasible payo¤s.
While the multiplicity in the standard folk theorems may suggest a need for a re…nement, the multiplicity in our unre…nable folk theorem emphasizes the impossibility of a robust re…nement.
Structure Theorem with Uncertainty only about the Stage Payo¤s. An important drawback of the structure theorems is that they may rely on existence of types who are far from the payo¤ and information structure assumed in the original model. If a researcher is willing to make common knowledge assumptions regarding these structures, those structure theorems may become inapplicable. Indeed, recent papers (e.g. Weinstein and Yildiz (2011) and Penta (2008)) study the robust predictions when some common knowledge assumptions are retained.
In repeated games, one may wish to maintain common knowledge of the repeated-game payo¤ structure. Unfortunately, in our proofs of the propositions above, the types we construct do not preserve common knowledge of such a structure -they may depend on the entire history in ways which are not additively separable across stages. It is more di¢ cult to construct types with unique rationalizable action when we restrict the perturbations to preserve common knowledge of the repeated-game structure, but in our next two propositions we are able to do this. The proofs (deferred to the Appendix) are somewhat lengthy and require the use of incentive structures similar to those in the repeated-game literature.
For any …xed discount factor 2 (0; 1), we de…ne
as the set of repeated games with discount factor . Here, allows uncertainty about the stage payo¤s g, but …xes all the other aspects of the repeated game, including the discount factor. For a …xed complete information repeated game with stage-payo¤ function g , we are interested in the predictions which are robust against perturbations in which it remains common knowledge that the payo¤s come from , allowing only uncertainty about the stage payo¤s. The complete information game is represented by type pro…le t CK ( ;g ) in the universal type space. The next result extends Corollary 1 to this case.
Proposition 3. For any 2 (0; 1), let ; f g ; t CK ( ;g ) ; be a complete-information repeated game and a be a Nash equilibrium of this game. For any i 2 N , for any neighbor-
( ;g )) in the universal type space T , any " > 0 and any L, there exists a hierarchy h i t i 2 U i ; such that
for all j 2 N and for all rationalizable belief oft i on ( ; a), and (3) according tot i it is common knowledge that 2 .
Proposition 3 strengthens Corollary 1 by adding the last condition that the perturbed type still …nds it common knowledge that he is playing a repeated game that is identical to the original complete-information game in all aspects except for the stage payo¤s. The conclusion is weakened only by being silent about the tails, which will be immaterial to our conclusions. Indeed, using Proposition 3 instead of Corollary 1 in the proof of Proposition 2, which is the main result in this application, one can easily extend that folk theorem to the world in which a researcher is willing to retain common knowledge of the repeated game structure:
Proposition 4. For all v 2 intV , there exists < 1 such that for all 2 ; 1 , for all " > 0 and all L < 1, every open neighborhood U of t CK ( ) contains a type pro…let 2 U such that
(1) eacht i has a unique rationalizable action a i up to date L in reduced form;
(2) under every rationalizable belief oft i , the expected payo¤s are all within " neighborhood of v:
(3) and it is common knowledge according tot that 2 .
That is, even if a researcher is willing to assume the repeated game payo¤ structure, for high discount factors, he cannot rule out any feasible payo¤ vector as the approximate outcome of the unique rationalizable belief for some nearby type. Hence, allowing uncertainty about the stage payo¤s is su¢ cient to reach the conclusion of the unre…nable folk theorem above.
Proposition 3 is proved in the Appendix. The proof …rst involves showing that each action plan is uniquely rationalizable, up to an arbitrarily long …nite horizon, for a type for which it is common knowledge that 2 . The construction of these types is rather involved, and uses ideas from learning and incentives in repeated games. Using the existence of these types, one then constructs the nearby types in the proposition following the ideas sketched in illustrating the proof of Corollary 1 above. In the following example we illustrate the gist of the idea on the twice-repeated prisoners'dilemma.
Example 1. Consider again the twice-repeated prisoners'dilemma with g
is the payo¤ of player 1 in the stage game, and = 1. Given a type who believes the payo¤s g P D are common knowledge, we will construct a nearby type for which tit-for-tat is uniquely rationalizable. To this end, we …rst construct some types (not necessarily nearby) for which certain action plans are uniquely rationalizable. For any strat- puts positive probability at all histories at the beginning of the second period that are not precluded by his own action. Hence, his unique rationalizable action plan is to play b i at all histories. We next construct types t i;k with approximate kth-order mutual knowledge of prisoners' dilemma payo¤s who Defect at all histories in their unique rationalizable plan.
Type t i;1 puts probability 1=2 on each of ;g P D ; t i;C;1 and ;g P D ; t i;D;1 . Since the other player does not react to the moves of player i and i is certain that he plays a prisoners' dilemma game, his unique rationalizable plan is to defect everywhere (as he assigns positive probabilities to both moves). Proceeding inductively on k, for any small " and k > 1, consider the type t i;k who puts probability 1 " on ;g P D ; t i;k 1 and probability " on ;g P D ; t i;C;1 . By the previous argument, type t i;k also defects at all histories as the unique rationalizable plan. Moreover, when " is small, there is approximate kth-order mutual knowledge of prisoners' dilemma. Now for arbitrary k > 1 and small " > 0, consider the type t i;k that puts probability 1 " on ;g P D ; t i;k 1 and probability " on ;g (C;C) ; t i;C;1 . He has approximate kth-order mutual knowledge of the prisoners'dilemma payo¤s. Moreover, since his opponent does not react to his moves and " is small, his unique rationalizable move at the …rst period is D. In the second period, if he observes that his opponent played D in the …rst period, he becomes sure that they play prisoners'dilemma and plays D as his unique rationalizable move. If he observes that his opponent played C, however, he updates his belief and put probability 1 on g (C;C) according to which C dominates D. In that case, he too plays C in the second period. The typest i;k , which are close to common-knowledge types, defect in period 1 and play tit-for-tat in period 2. Now consider the nearby typest i;k that put probability 1 " on ;g P D ;t i;k 1 and probability " on ;g (C;C) ; t i;C;1 . These types believe that their opponent probably plays defection followed by tit-for-tat, so they cooperate in the …rst period. In the second period, if they saw D, they still think they are playing prisoner's dilemma, so they defect. If they saw C, they think they are playing g (C;C) , so they cooperate. That is, their unique rationalizable action is tit-for-tat with cooperation at the initial node.
Early literature identi…ed two mechanisms through which a small amount of incomplete information can have a large e¤ect: reputation formation (Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and
Wilson (1982)) and contagion (Rubinstein (1989) ). In reputation formation, one learns about the other players'payo¤s from their unexpected moves. As in Example 1, our perturbed types in the proof of Proposition 3 generalize this idea: they learn not only about the other players'
payo¤s but also about their own payo¤s from the others'unexpected moves. Moreover, our perturbations are explicitly constructed using a generalized contagion argument. Hence, the perturbations here and in Chen (2008) combine the two mechanisms in order to obtain a very strong conclusion: any rationalizable action can be made uniquely rationalizable under some perturbation.
At another level, however, Propositions 3 and 4 make a stronger point than the previous reputation and contagion literatures, in the following sense: The existing models mainly rely on behavioral commitment types (or "crazy" types) that follow a complete plan of action throughout the game, suggesting that non-robustness may be due to psychological/behavioral concerns that are overlooked in game-theoretical analyses. By proving the to receiving information, but our setup does not actually require reference to a particular information structure (type space with prior). For more on the distinction between these approaches, see our 2007 paper. Second, while they focus on serially independent types, whose moves do not reveal any information about future payo¤s, the moves of our perturbed types reveal information about both their own and the other players' stage-game payo¤s, which are assumed to be constant over time.
Some other papers have also restricted attention to perturbations which keep some payo¤ structure common knowledge. In Weinstein and Yildiz (2011), we dealt with nice games, which are static games with unidimensional action spaces and strictly concave utility functions. We obtained a characterization for sensitivity of Bayesian Nash equilibria in terms of a local version of ICR, allowing arbitrary common-knowledge restrictions on payo¤s. 7 In the 6 Of course, this allows for "crazy" types who always play the same action -but not for those who play any more complicated plan, say tit-for-tat. 7 Weinstein and Yildiz (2011) also solve the problem of uncountable action spaces within the important class of nice games using a special structure of those games, which is clearly di¤erent from the structure in in…nite-horizon games that allowed our characterization. and compactness properties, provided that the space of payo¤s can be embedded into a compact metric space. In particular, we show that ICR is upper hemicontinuous whenever the payo¤s are restricted to be in , imposing common knowledge of the repeated-game payo¤ structure and the discount factor. In fact, it su¢ ces for the discount factor to be unknown but bounded away from 1. Therefore, the predictions of ICR are robust under the above restriction. This further implies that the unique solution for the perturbed types remains robust with respect to further perturbations. We should note, however, that the set of all payo¤ functions in in…nite-horizon games is not metrizable (or sequentially compact), and so we do not know if ICR is upper hemicontinuous in the entire universal type space.
We should also note that, while Bayesian Nash equilibrium is not upper hemicontinuous in general (by Lemma 1), it is robust with respect to perturbations that assign high probability on the unique outcome (as in Proposition 1).
Application: Incomplete Information in Bargaining
In a model of bilateral bargaining with complete information, Rubinstein (1982) shows that there exists a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Subsequent research illustrates that the equilibrium result is sensitive to incomplete information. In this section, using Proposition 1, we show quite generally that the equilibrium must be highly sensitive: every bargaining outcome can be supported as the unique rationalizable outcome for a nearby model.
We consider Rubinstein's alternating-o¤er model with …nite set of divisions. There are two players, N = f1; 2g, who want to divide a dollar. The set of possible shares is X = f0; 1=m; 2=m; : : : ; 1g for some m > 1. At date 0, Player 1 o¤ers a division (x; 1 x), where x 2 X is the share of Player 1 and 1 x is the share of Player 2. Player 2 decides whether to accept or reject the o¤er. If he accepts, the game ends with division (x; 1 x). Otherwise,
we proceed to the next date. At date 1, Player 2 o¤ers a division (y; 1 y), and Player 1 accepts or rejects the o¤er. In this fashion, players make o¤ers back and forth until an o¤er is accepted. We denote the bargaining outcome by (x; l) if players reach an agreement on division (x; 1 x) at date l. In the complete-information game, the payo¤ function is = ( l (x; 1 x) if the outcome is (x; l) 0 if players never agree for some 2 (0; 1).
When X = [0; 1], in the complete information game G = ; f g ; t CK ( ) ; , there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, and the bargaining outcome in the unique subgameperfect equilibrium is
That is, the players immediately agree on division (x ; 1 x ). When X = f0; 1=m; : : : ; 1g as in here, there are more subgame-perfect equilibria due to multiple equilibrium behavior in the case of indi¤erence. Nevertheless, the bargaining outcomes of these equilibria all converge to (x ; 0) as m ! 1.
In contrast with the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium, there is a large multiplicity of non-subgame-perfect Nash equilibria, but these equilibria are ignored as they rely on incredible threats or sequentially irrational moves o¤ the path. Building on such non-subgameperfect Nash equilibria and Proposition 1, the next result shows that each bargaining outcome is the outcome of unique rationalizable action plan under some perturbation.
Proposition 5. For any bargaining outcome (x; l) 2 X N and any " > 0, every open neighborhood U of t CK ( ) contains a type pro…let 2 U such that
(1) eacht i has a unique rationalizable action a i in reduced form;
(2) the bargaining outcome under a is (x; l), and (3) every rationalizable belief oft i assigns at least probability 1 " on (x; l).
Proof. We will show that the complete-information game has a Nash equilibrium a with bargaining outcome (x; l). Proposition 1 then establishes the existence of type pro…let as in the statement of the proposition. Consider the case of even l, at which Player 1 makes an o¤er; the other case is identical. De…ne a in reduced-form as (a 1 ) at any date l 0 6 = l, o¤er only (1; 0) and reject all the o¤ers; o¤er (x; 1 x) at date l;
(a 2 ) at any date l 0 6 = l, o¤er only (0; 1) and reject all the o¤ers; accept only (x; 1 x) at l.
It is clear that a is a Nash equilibrium, and the bargaining outcome under a is (x; l).
That is, for every bargaining outcome (x; l), one can introduce a small amount of incomplete information in such a way that the resulting type pro…le has a unique rationalizable action pro…le and it leads to the bargaining outcome (x; l). Moreover, in the perturbed type pro…le, players are all nearly certain that (x; l) will be realized. Unlike in the case of non-subgame-perfect equilibria, one cannot rule out these outcomes by re…nement because there is a unique rationalizable outcome. In order to rule out these outcomes, one either needs to introduce irrational behavior or rule out the information structure that leads to the perturbed type pro…le by …at (as he cannot rule out these structures by observation of …nite-order beliefs without ruling out the original model). Therefore, despite the unique subgame-perfect outcome in the original model, and despite the fact that this outcome has generated many important and intuitive insights, one cannot make any prediction on the outcome without introducing irrational behavior or making informational assumptions that cannot be veri…ed by observing …nite-order beliefs.
The existing literature already illustrates that the subgame-perfect equilibrium is sensitive to incomplete information. For example, for high , the literature on the Coase conjecture establishes that if one party has a private information about his own valuation, then he gets everything-in contrast to the nearly equal sharing in the complete information game. This further leads to delay due to reputation formation in bargaining with two-sided incomplete information on payo¤s (Abreu and Gul (2000)) or on players'second-order beliefs (Feinberg and Skrzypacz (2005) ). Third, the existing results often consider the limit ! 0, which is already a point of discontinuity for the complete-information model. In contrast, is …xed in Proposition 5. Finally, existing results consider simple perturbations, and these perturbations may correspond the speci…cation of economic parameters, such as valuation, or may be commitment types. In contrast, given the generality of the results, the types constructed in our paper are complicated, and it is not easy to interpret how they are related to the economic parameters. (In speci…c examples, the same results could be obtained using simple types that correspond to economic parameters, as in Izmalkov and Yildiz (2010)).
Information and Sequential Rationality
We have discussed earlier that when analyzing robustness, one may want to consider only perturbations which retain some structural common-knowledge assumptions, such as the additive payo¤ structure in a repeated game. When the set of possible payo¤ functions is the same from the point of view of every player, our formalism su¢ ces for this. If each player may have his own information, and furthermore this information (unlike mere beliefs) is never doubted even when probability-zero events occur, a slightly di¤erent setup, introduced by Penta (2008), is necessary. This setup is needed, for instance, to analyze a case in which it is common knowledge that players know (and never doubt) their own utility functions. When the underlying set of payo¤ parameters is su¢ ciently rich (e.g. when all possible payo¤ functions are available as in our model above), retaining such assumptions does not lead to any change, and the original characterization in Lemma 1 remains intact.
In restricted parameter sets, retaining the informational assumption may lead to somewhat sharper predictions. For example, in private value environments, this allows one round of elimination of weakly dominated actions in addition to rationalizability. In this section, building on an extension of the result of Penta (2008) to in…nite horizon games, we will extend our results to Penta's setup. Note also that Penta's framework is related to that of Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) , who introduced a version of rationalizabilty for extensiveform games which allowed for restrictions on players'beliefs about their opponents'behavior.
Consider a compact set C = C 0 C 1 C n of payo¤ parameters c = (c 0 ; c 1 ; : : : ; c n )
where the underlying payo¤ functions depends on the payo¤ parameters c:
for some continuous and one-to-one mapping f : C ! . We will assume it is common knowledge that lies in the subspace f (C) . It will also be assumed to be common knowledge throughout the section that the true value of the parameter c i is known by player i. For any type t i , we will write c i (t i ) for the true value of c i , which is known by t i . Note that this formulation subsumes our model above, by simply letting C 1 ; : : : ; C n be trivial (singletons) so that = C 0 . We will write T C T for the subspace of the universal type space in which it is common knowledge that 2 f (C) and each player i knows the true value of c i . As in Penta (2008), we will restrict perturbations to lie in T C . Following Penta, we will further focus on multistage games in which all previous moves are publicly observable.
A conjecture of a player i is a conditional probability system i = i;h h2H that is consistent with Bayes'rule (on positive probability events), where i;h 2 (C 0 T i A i )
for each h 2 H. Here, it is implicitly assumed that it remains common knowledge throughout the game that (c 1 ; : : : ; c n ) = (c 1 (t 1 ) ; : : : ; c n (t n )). In particular, player i assigns probability 1 to c i (t i ) throughout the game. For each conjecture i of type t i , we write SBR i ( i jt i )
for the set of actions a i 2 A i that remain a best response to i at all information sets that are not precluded by a i ; we refer to a i 2 SBR i ( i jt i ) as a sequential best response.
A solution concept i : the sequential best-reply property. In …nite games this is equivalent to the result of a iterative elimination process similar to iterative elimination of strictly dominated actions (see Penta (2008) for that alternative de…nition). Note that ISR di¤ers from ICR only in requiring sequential rationality, rather than normal-form rationality. The only restriction here comes from the common knowledge assumption that the player i does not change his belief about c i , since the players'conjectures o¤ the path are otherwise unrestricted. The resulting solution concept is relatively weak (e.g. weaker than extensive form rationalizability) and equal to ICR in rich environments. 8 We use the following richness assumption of Penta (2008) .
Assumption 1 (Penta (2008) ). For every a i 2 A i there exists c a i such that a i is conditionally dominant under c a i , i.e., at every history that is consistent with a i , following a i is better than deviating from a i . These are the predictions that can be made by interim sequential rationality alone. One cannot obtain a sharper robust prediction than those of interim sequential rationalizability by considering its re…nements, even if one is willing to retain common knowledge assumptions regarding players'information. 8 For example, ISR is equal to ICR if for every a i and c i , there exists (c 0 ; c i ) such that a i is conditionally dominant under (c 0 ; c i ; c i ) (cf. Assumption 1). ISR is equal to ICR also when no player has any information.
See Penta (2009) for further details. 9 While this assumption rules out pure private value environments in which jC 0 j = 1, it allows approximate private value environments in which the players know their payo¤ functions up to an arbitrarily small error ".
Using Lemma 3, one can also extend our other results to this framework. Here, we will only formally present the extension of Corollary 1, our structure theorem for equilibrium in the case of complete information; the proof is relegated to the Appendix.
Proposition 6. Under Assumption 1, let ; f g ; t CK ( ) ; be a multi-stage completeinformation game that is continuous at in…nity, with = f (c ) 2 in the interior of f (C 0 f(c 1 ; : : : ; c n )g). Let also a 2 ISR 1 t CK ( ) be a Nash equilibrium of this game.
Then, for any i 2 N , for any L < 1, for any neighborhood U i of h i (t CK i ( )) in the universal type space T , and any " > 0, there exists a hierarchy h i t i 2 U i \ T C i ; such that for every ISR belief oft i ,
Like Proposition 3, this result remains silent for the tail behavior, establishing uniqueness of ISR only up to an arbitrary …nite horizon. The result is stronger than Corollary 1, in that the perturbed types are in T C i , retaining common knowledge of informational assumptions. Note that the result also assumes that a is ISR, putting a weak restriction on equilibrium.
Since subgame-perfect equilibria of a repeated game are ISR, the unre…nable folk theorem in Proposition 2 also extends to the current setup.
Conclusion
In economic models there are often a multitude of equilibria. This problem is especially acute in in…nite-horizon games, such as repeated games, in which the folk theorem applies, establishing that any feasible payo¤ vector can be supported by an equilibrium. In response to such multiplicity, economists often focus on re…nements. In this paper, we develop a structure theorem for in…nite-horizon games that can be readily used in applications. Our result establishes that without any common-knowledge assumption regarding payo¤s and information structure, one cannot obtain any robust prediction that is not implied by Bayesian Nash equilibrium alone. As an application, we prove an unre…nable folk theorem, showing that no feasible payo¤ vector can be excluded if there is noise in our knowledge of players'beliefs.
Our construction allows uncertainty only about the stage payo¤s. This shows that, even without the large set of commitment types used in the reputation literature, the uncertainty behind the structure theorem can operate with full force.
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1
In our proofs we will also apply the following continuity lemma from Mertens-Zamir (1985) . (1985)). Let ( ; T; ) be any model, endowed with any topology, such that T is compact and t i is a continuous function of t i . Then, h is continuous.
Lemma 4 (Mertens and Zamir
Using Lemma 1, we …rst establish that every action can be made rationalizable for some type.
This extends the lemma of Chen from equivalence at histories of bounded length to equivalence at histories of unbounded length.
Lemma 5. For all plans of action a i ; there is a type t a i of player i such that a i is the unique rationalizable action for t a i , up to reduced-form equivalence.
Proof. The set of non-terminal histories is countable, as each of them has …nite length. Index the set of histories where it is i's move and the history thus far is consistent with a i as fh (k) : k 2 Z + g.
By Lemma 1, for each k there is a type t k i whose rationalizable actions are always consistent with history h (k). We construct type t a i as follows: his belief about t i assigns probability 2 k to type t k i . His belief about is a point-mass on the function a i , de…ned as 1 if all of i's actions were consistent with a i and 1 2 k if his …rst inconsistent move was at history h (k). Now, if type t a i plays action a i he receives a certain payo¤ of 1. If his plan b i is not reduced-form equivalent to a i , let h (k) be the shortest history in the set fh (k) :
By construction, there is probability at least 2 k of reaching this history if he believes the other player's action is rationalizable, so his expected payo¤ is at most 1 2 2k . This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1. We …rst show that (A) implies (B). Assume that s is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of G. Construct a family of types j (t j ; m; ),
For large m and small , j (t i ; m; ) satis…es all the properties oft i , as we establish below. Now, we use mathematical induction on m to show that for all > 0 and for all m and t j , a j 2 S 1 j [ j (t j ; m; )] if and only if a j is equivalent to s j (t j ), establishing the …rst conclusion in (B). This statement is true for m = 0 by de…nition of j (t j ; 0; ) and Lemma 5. Now assume that it is true up to some m 1. Consider any rationalizable belief of any type j (t j ; m; ). With probability , his belief is the same as that of t s j (t j ) . By de…nition, s j (t j ) is the unique best response to this belief in reduced form actions. With probability 1 , his belief on A j is the same as the equilibrium belief of t j on A j . The action s j (t j ) is also a best reply to this belief because s is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the original game. Therefore, s j (t j ) is the unique best response to the rationalizable belief of type j (t j ; m; ) in reduced form. Since type j (t j ; m; ) and his rationalizable belief are picked arbitrarily, this proves the statement.
Note that by the preceding paragraph, for any > 0 and m > 0, j (t j ; m; ) has a unique rationalizable belief (t j ; m; ) = j (t j ;m; ) 1 j;m; where j;m; : ( ; h j (t j ; m; )) 7 ! ; h j (t j ; m; ) ; s j (t j ) : Here, the mapping j;m; corresponds to the fact that the newly constructed types play according to the equilibrium strategy of the original types. We leave the actions of the other types unassigned as their actions are not relevant for our proof. For = 0, we de…ne (t j ; m; ) by the same equation, although the type j (t j ; m; ) may also have other rationalizable beliefs.
In order to show that for large m and small , the beliefs of j (t j ; m; ) are as in the proposition, note that for = 0, the mth-order belief of j (t j ; m; 0) is equal to the mth-order belief of t j . Hence, as m ! 1, h j ( j (t j ; m; 0)) ! h j (t j ) for each j. Consequently, for each j, as m ! 1, (t j ; m; 0) converges to
with j : ( ; t j ) 7 ! ; t j ; s j (t j ) :
Note that t j is the equilibrium belief of type t j under s . Therefore, there exists m > 0 such that Lemma 4, 10 for each t j , as ! 0, h j ( j (t j ; m; )) ! h j ( j (t j ; m; 0)) and (thereby) (t j ; m; ) ! (t j ; m; 0). Thus, there exists > 0 such that h i i t i ; m; 2 U i and t i ; m; 2 V i . Therefore, the typet i = i t i ; m; satis…es all the properties in (B). 10 To ensure compactness, put all of the types in construction of types t s j (t j ) together and for (t j ; m; ) for the set of types of player i according to which it is common knowledge that 2 , i.e. that we are playing a repeated game with discount factor . In order to harness our previous constructions, in Lemma 7 we will construct, for every possible plan a i and …nite
for which all rationalizable plans are L-equivalent to a i . These types then play the role that dominant-action types would play in richer environments. Our …rst step towards this, Lemma 6, constructs types who do not believe the other players' actions ever a¤ect them directly, but who …nd others' actions informative about their own payo¤s. They are further constructed so as to always choose the "myopic" action, optimizing the expected payo¤ in the current period. This construction will not work on all plans, but only on those satisfying this version of the sure-thing principle:
A plan a i is said to be sure-thing compliant if and only if there is no partial history h and move
In other words, a plan is sure-thing compliant if whenever the player plays b i in all possible continuations next period, he also plays b i this period. This is of course equivalent to the surething principle of Savage if the player has the same preferences over his moves in both periods.
Given that, in our construction in the next proof, player i is actually facing a single-player decision problem with unknown payo¤s, it is not hard to see that this particular construction can only work for sure-thing compliant plans. Of course the necessity of the condition is not relevant to later results, and our further construction in Lemma 7 extends the result to all plans.
Lemma 6. For any , any L, and any sure-thing compliant action plan a i , there exists a type
for which all rationalizable plans are L-equivalent to a i .
Proof. We will induct on L. When L = 0, it su¢ ces to consider a type t a i ;0 who is certain that a i (?) is a dominant action in the stage game. Now …x L; a i and assume the result is true for all players and for L 1. In outline: the type we construct will have payo¤s which are completely insensitive to the actions of the other players, but will …nd those actions informative about his own payo¤s. He also will believe that if he ever deviates from a i , the other players'subsequent actions are uninformative -this ensures that he always chooses the myopically best action.
Formally: LetĤ be the set of histories of length L 1 in which player i always follows the plan a i , so that jĤj = jB i j L 1 , where B i is the set of pro…les of static moves for the other players.
For each history h 2Ĥ, we construct a pair (t h i ; h ), and our constructed type t a i ;L assigns equal weight to each of jB i j L 1 such pairs. Each type t h i is constructed by applying the inductive hypothesis to a plan a h i which plays according to history h so long as i follows a i , and simply repeats the previous move forever if player i deviates. Such plans are sure-thing compliant for the player(s) i because at every history, the current action is repeated on at least one branch.
To de…ne the payo¤ functions
h for all h 2Ĥ, we will need to de…ne an auxiliary function 
Case 2: Otherwise, by sure-thing compliance, at least two di¤erent actions are prescribed for con-
be the set of continuations where b i is prescribed. Then let
where the last denominator is non-zero by the observation that at least two di¤erent actions are prescribed.
These payo¤s were chosen to satisfy the constraints 
as in (4.1). De…ne t a i ;L as mentioned above, by assigning equal weight to each pair (t h i ; h ).
We claim that under rationalizable play, from the perspective of type t a i ;L , when he has followed a i and reaches history h 2H, f (h; ) is his expected value of the stage-game payo¤ g i . We show this by induction on the length of histories, backwards. When a history h 2Ĥ is reached, player i knows (assuming rationalizable play) the opposing types must be t h i and thus the payo¤s must be h , which is the desired result for this case. Suppose the claim is true for all histories inH of length M . Note that type t a i ;L puts equal weight on all sequences of play for his opponent. Therefore, for a history h 2H of length M 1, the expected payo¤s are given by the right-hand-side of (B.1) which proves the claim.
Note also that if he follows a i through period L, player i always learns his true payo¤. Let a i be the plan which follows a i through period L, then plays the known optimal action from period L + 1 onward. We claim that a i strictly outperforms any plan which deviates by period L. The intuitive argument is as follows. Because type t a i ;L has stage-game payo¤s which are insensitive to the other players'moves, he only has two possible incentives at each stage: the myopic goal of maximizing his average stage-game payo¤s at the current stage, and the desire to receive further information about his payo¤s. The former goal is strictly satis…ed by the move prescribed by a i , and the latter is at least weakly satis…ed by this move, since after a deviation he receives no further information.
Formally, we must show that for any …xed plan a 0 i not L-equivalent to a i and any rationalizable belief of t a i ;L , the plan a i gives a better expected payo¤. Given a rationalizable belief on opponents' actions, player i has a uniform belief on the other players'actions as long as he follows a i . Letĥ be a random variable equal to the shortest realized history at which a 0 i di¤ers from a i before period L, or 1 if they do not di¤er by period L. Note that the uniform belief on others'actions implies thatĥ 6 = 1 with positive probability. We show that conditional on any non-in…nite value ofĥ, a i strictly outperforms a 0 i on average. In fact this is weakly true stage-by-stage, and strictly true at the …rst deviation, because:
At stages 1; :::; jĥj: The plans are identical.
At stage jĥj + 1: The average payo¤ f (ĥ; b i ) is strictly optimized by a i (ĥ).
At stages jĥj + 2; :::; L: Along the path observed by a player following a 0 i , the other players are known to repeat their stage-jĥj + 1 move at stages jĥj + 2; :::; L. So at these stages, the plan a 0 i cannot do better than to optimize with respect to the history truncated at length jĥj + 1. The plan a i optimizes the expected stage-game payo¤s with respect to a longer history, under which opposing moves are identical through stage jĥj + 1. Since he is therefore solving a less-constrained optimization problem, he must perform better than a 0 i at each stage jĥj + 2; :::; L.
At stages L + 1; :::: Under plan a i , player i now has complete information about his payo¤ and optimizes perfectly, so a 0 i cannot do better. Ifĥ = 1, again a i cannot be outperformed because he optimizes based on complete information after L, and a i and a 0 i prescribe the same behavior before L.
Finally, since there are only …nitely many histories and types in the construction, all payo¤s are bounded and so can be normalized to lie in [0; 1].
The next lemma builds on this result to generalize to all action plans. 
for all those h L such that player i has played according to a i throughout, and (3) for any l 2 fL + 2; : : : ; M g and any h at the beginning of l, a i (h) = a i h L+1 .
11 Note that h l 1 is the list of moves played at dates 0; 1; : : : ; l 2, and a j h l 1 ; b is the move of player j at date l if players play b at l 1 after history h l 1 .
That is: At any history in h 2Ĥ, the other players reward a unique move (h; b i ) of i at each history (h; b). The only restriction on which move is rewarded occurs at stage L + 1, when if player i has followed a i so far, he will be rewarded if he continues to do so. Furthermore, at stages fL + 2; : : : ; M g the other players simply repeat their move from stage L + 1. The setÂ i is symmetric in all other ways. Note also that at any l M , a player j either reacts di¤erently to di¤erent moves of player i or repeats his previous move regardless. Hence, the actions inÂ i are all sure-thing compliant up to date M , and thus for each a i 2Â i , there exists a sure-thing compliant actionâ i that is M -equivalent to a i . LetÂ M i be a …nite subset of A i that consists of one sure-thing compliant element from each M -equivalence class inÂ i . By Lemma 6, for each a i 2Â M i , there exists t a i ;M for which all rationalizable action pro…les are M -equivalent to a i . Consider a type t a i ;L i that assigns probability 1= Â m i to each ^ ; t a i ;M with a i 2Â m i . Note that, according to t a i ;L i the rewarded actions up to l = L 1 are independently and identically distributed with uniform distribution over his moves. This leads to the formulas for the probability of reward in the next paragraph.
For any history h of length l, write P l (h) for the probability that b i is played at date l conditional on h according to the rationalizable belief of t Using the above formulas, we will now show that type t a i ;L i
does not have a best response that di¤ers from a i at some history of length l L. Consider such an action plan a 0 i . De…ne also a i , by setting
a 0 i h l if l > L at each history h l of length l. We will show that a i yields a strictly higher expected payo¤ than a 0 i . To this end, for each history h, de…ne (h) as the smallest date l such that the play of player i is in accordance with both a i and a 0 i throughout history h l , a i h l 6 = a 0 i h l , and player i plays a 0 i h l at date l according to h. (Here, can be in…nite. It equals the …rst realized di¤erence in moves; note that even if the two plans are not equivalent, they may not di¤er on a particular history.)
Conditioned on the event > L, we know = 1, that is, a i and a 0 i play identical moves and hence yield the same payo¤. We will show that a i has a strictly higher expected payo¤ than a 0 i when conditioned on each of the events = L and < L. On the event = L, by (B .3) and (B.4), a 0 This lemma establishes that any action can be made uniquely rationalizable for an arbitrarily long horizon, even within the restricted class of repeated game payo¤s with the given discount factor . Using this lemma, we can now prove Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 3. First, note that by continuity at in…nity there exist 2 (0; 1) and l < 1 such that if a player i assigns at least probability 1 on the event that = ;g and everybody follows a up to date l , then the expected payo¤ vector under his belief will be within " neighborhood of u ( ;g ; a ).
We construct a family of types t j;m;l; , j 2 N , m; l 2 N, 2 0; , by t j;0;l; = t a j ;l ; where t a j ;l 2 T CK( ) j is the type for whom a j is uniquely rationalizable up to date l, ( ;g ;t i;m 1; )
is the Dirac measure that puts probability one on ;g ; t i;m 1;l 0 and l 0 will be de…ned momentarily. The types t j;m;l; will be constructed in such a way that under any rationalizable plan they will follow a j up to date l and the …rst m orders of beliefs will be within neighborhood of t CK ( ;g ). Note that under t a j ;l it is a unique best reply to follow a j up to date l. Moreover, if = ;g and the other players follow a j forever, then it is a best response to follow a j up to date l. Hence, it is a unique best response to follow a j up to date l if one puts probability on t a j ;l and (1 ) on the latter scenario with = ;g . Since there are only …nitely many plans to follow up to date l and the game is continuous at in…nity, there exists a …nite l 0 l such that it is still the unique best response under ;g to follow a j up to date l if the other players played a j only up to date l 0 . We pick such an l 0 l .
We now show that for large m and l and small , t i;m;l; satis…es all the desired properties oft i .
First note that for = 0, under t i;m;l;0 , it is mth-order mutual knowledge that = ;g . Hence,
there exist m and > 0 such that when m m and , the belief hierarchy of t i;m;l; is within the neighborhood U i of the belief hierarchy of t CK i ( ;g ), according to which it is common knowledge that = ;g . Second, for > 0, a j is uniquely rationalizable up to date l for t j;m;l; in reduced form. To see this, observing that it is true for m = 0 by de…nition of t j;0;l; , assume that it is true up to some m 1. Then, any rationalizable belief of any type t j;m;l; must be a mixture of two beliefs. With probability , his belief is the same as that of t a j ;l , and with probability 1 , he believes that the true state is ;g and the other players play a j (in reduced form) up to date l 0 . But we have chosen l 0 so that following a j up to date l is a unique best response under that belief. Therefore, any rationalizable action of t j;m;l; is l-equivalent to a j . Third, for any m > 0 and l l , the expected payo¤s are within " neighborhood of u ( ;g ; a ). Indeed, under rationalizability, type t i;m;l; must assign at least probability 1 1 on = ;g and that the other players follow a i up to date l 0 l while he himself follows a i up to date l l . The expected payo¤ vector is " neighborhood of u ( ;g ; a ) under such a belief by de…nition of and l .
Finally, each t j;m;l; is in T CK( ) j because all possible types in the construction assigns probability 1 on 2 . We complete our proof by pickingt i = t i;m;l; for some m > m , l max fL; l g, and 2 0; min ; .
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 6
Though Proposition 6 is a close analogue of the general result on equilibria, Proposition 1, its proof is more closely analogous to the …nal steps in our result speci…c to repeated games, Proposition 3. (It is in the lemmas preceding that proof that the steps speci…c to repeated games occur.) Here we describe how we modify the proof of Proposition 3 to prove Proposition 6.
Proof of Proposition 6. In the proof of Proposition 3, modify the types t j;m;l; by substituting for ;g and taking t a j ;l to be the type in T C j for whom a j is uniquely ISR up to date l and c j t a j ;l = c j (by Proposition 3). Take also c j (t j;m;l; ) = c j , so that h j (t j;0;l; ) 2 T C j . Moreover, as in the proof of Proposition 3, since playing according to a j up to l is the unique sequential best response for type t j;m;l; when the others follow a j forever, we can take l 0 su¢ ciently large so that following a j remains the unique sequential best response up to l when the others follow a j up to l 0 . As in the proof of Proposition 3, this shows that a j is the unique ISR plan for type t j;m;l; . Finally, as in the proof of Proposition 3, one can select m, l, and to satisfy the other properties in the proposition.
